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The literature on North-South trade has explored conditions under which international
trade might magnify income disparities between the advanced North and the backward South.
Little attention has yet been placed on the e⁄ect of trade on countries that do not display
substantial dissimilarities concerning aggregate capital endowments. We show that even
when no single country is technologically more advanced than any other one and productivity
changes are uniform and identical in all countries, international trade may still be a source
of income divergence when nonhomothetic preferences and quality ladders are jointly taken
into account. Income divergence will be experienced when comparative advantages induce
patterns of specialisation that, although optimal for each country at some initial point in
time, do not o⁄er the same scope for improvements in terms of subsequent quality upgrading
of ￿nal products.
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11 Introduction
In the past two decades a number of articles on international trade have started to acknowledge
the importance of nonhomothetic preferences for capturing some relevant features of North-South
trade ￿e.g., Flam and Helpman (1987), Stokey (1991), and Matsuyama (2000). These papers
have developed tractable models that yield patterns of specialisation where richer countries
produce and export goods with high income demand elasticity. One of the main predictions of
those models is that the impact of international trade on growth may be uneven across countries
which are at di⁄erent stages in the process of development. More precisely, trade would tend
to be more bene￿cial to developed economies (the North), and it may even be detrimental
to underdeveloped countries (the South). The key mechanism at work is the one originally
proposed by Prebisch (1950) and Singer (1950): as the world income rises, world aggregate
demand shifts towards the goods produced by the North, improving their terms of trade and,
thereby, magnifying initial income disparities between those richer economies and the South.
The papers mentioned above thus restrict the attention to a world economy where some coun-
tries (the North) have somehow historically accumulated larger amounts of human and physical
capital than others (the South), and show conditions under which trade magni￿es initial income
disparities resulting from those capital di⁄erences. However, the pattern of international special-
isation and trade might also be the source of income di⁄erentials between countries that do not
display any substantial dissimilarity regarding their initial levels of human and physical capital.
In this paper, we look at economies that start o⁄ with similar capital endowments, and pro-
pose a theory of uneven growth induced by trade, based on nonhomothetic preferences, quality
di⁄erentiation and productive specialisation driven by Ricardian comparative advantages.
Our theory rests on ￿ve fundamental elements. First, there exists a large number of con-
sumption goods in the economy. Second, each speci￿c type of consumption good is present in
several levels of quality, with higher qualities being increasingly costly to produce. Third, some
goods o⁄er larger scope for quality upgrading than others, in the sense that it is less costly to
increase their quality. Fourth, individuals care about the quality of the goods they consume
and, moreover, their willingness to pay for higher quality of consumption increases with their
income. Fifth, countries that are similar in terms of their average productivities specialise in
the production of di⁄erent goods according to their comparative advantage.
The ￿rst four elements above give room for nonhomothetic demand schedules, where the
income demand elasticity of every good is tied to the speci￿c quality in which that particular good
2is (optimally) traded in the market. The last element yields patterns of regional specialisation
that, combined with nonhomothetic demand schedules, may lead to divergent dynamics among
countries that are initially similar in terms of capital endowments. In such a framework, we show
that international trade may induce income divergence across countries characterised by similar
initial income levels and with no absolute advantage over one another. In particular, income
divergence will be experienced when comparative advantages dictate patterns of specialisation
that, although optimal for each speci￿c country at a given stage of development, do not o⁄er
the same scope for technological improvements in terms of subsequent quality upgrading of ￿nal
goods.
To convey some preliminary intuition of how nonhomothetic demand schedules arise as an
equilibrium result of our model, it is worth discussing in further detail some of the speci￿cities
of the commodity space. In that respect, we follow the quality ladder structure featured in
Grossman and Helpman (1991) ￿that is, in a continuum of horizontally di⁄erentiated goods, an
in￿nite number of qualities for each good are available in the market. Unlike Grossman-Helpman,
however, in our framework the optimal expenditure shares across goods do not remain constant
as income changes. In particular, we postulate that the additional utility the individual derives
from a marginal increase in the quality of the goods he consumes increases with the quantity
of consumption, hence with the individual￿ s income (in other words, the individual￿ s taste for
quality increases with income). As a result, as individuals become richer they optimally shift
resources towards those goods whose quality can be set at relatively higher levels. The budget
constraint, in turn, implies that the extent by which quality can be raised for any given type
of good is related to its speci￿c cost of quality upgrading. Thus, the distribution of quality
upgrading across goods results from the interplay between the underlying technological structure
and the response of the consumers￿taste for quality to income variations.
In such a framework we show that, if the cost of quality upgrading di⁄ers across goods, then
the shift towards higher-quality goods with rising income will (optimally) occur at di⁄erent
speeds across goods. More precisely, the lower the cost of quality upgrading for a speci￿c good,
the larger the quality upgrading for that good. This uneven climbing-up-the-quality-ladder will
in turn lead to nonhomothetic demand schedules, where the fraction of income spent in di⁄erent
goods depends on the level of income itself.
When introduced into a general equilibrium model of international trade, the interplay be-
tween quality upgrading and comparative advantage may lead to income divergence through its
e⁄ect on the terms of trade. To brie￿ y characterise this mechanism, take some hypothetical
3country (call it country Z) that specialises in the production of good x, which exhibits high cost
of quality upgrading. According to the mechanism proposed in this paper, quality upgrading for
x is relatively slow as world income grows. Hence, the world expenditure share on x decreases
over time, while it shifts towards goods whose quality can be upgraded faster. As a result, as
the world income rises, Z experiences a decline in its terms of trade, because the types of goods
it produces display low income demand elasticity.
An important and novel feature of our model is the fact that quality upgrading is a phenom-
enon that occurs within types of goods, and (possibly) heterogeneously across di⁄erent types
of goods. This, in turn, implies that our model generates two distinct (yet interrelated) types
of nonhomothetic behaviour: ￿rst, nonhomotheticity within goods arises as richer consumers
shift their expenditure towards higher-qualities of each speci￿c good; second, nonhomotheticity
across goods (possibly) arises as richer consumers shift their expenditure towards goods with
larger scope for quality upgrading.1
Our open economy model predicts that richer economies specialise in the production of
goods that exhibit larger scope for quality upgrading (in turn, implying that they specialise in
the production of higher-quality goods). This prediction is in fact consistent with the evidence
presented in Khandelwal (2009). This paper estimates the length of quality ladders for di⁄er-
ent industries, showing that import penetration from poorer economies in the US is lower in
industries that exhibit longer quality ladders (hence larger scope for quality upgrading), while
exports to the US originating from other developed economies tend to belong precisely to those
industries and, in particular, to the upper spectrum of their respective (long) quality ladders.2
The model also predicts that citizens from richer countries consume higher qualities than
those consumed by citizens from poorer countries. This prediction rationalises the ￿ndings by
Verhoogen (2008) and Iacovone and Javorcik (2009), who show that Mexican manufacturing
plants produce higher-quality goods to export to richer markets (mainly the US), and by Hallak
1Notice that we keep the word ￿ possibly￿in parenthesis for a very speci￿c reason: if all goods o⁄ered the same
scope of quality upgrading, then our model would no longer feature the second source of nonhomotheticity (i.e.,
expenditure shares would remain constant across types of goods with rising income).
2Schott (2004) also shows that the quality dimension within varieties of goods (measured in his paper by unit
values) is key to understand trade patterns in the world economy. In particular, he provides evidence that US
import unit values correlate positively with the exporter￿ s GDP per head. Moreover, this positive correlation
tends to be more pronounced for goods that exhibit larger scope for quality upgrading (e.g., manufactured goods)
compared to more homogeneous goods (e.g., natural resources goods). See also Hallak (2006) for related evidence
showing that rich countries import relatively more from countries that produce higher-quality goods.
4and Schott (2009) who, using cross-country data, show that the quality gap in production
between rich and poor economies is smaller than their income gap, which suggests that poorer
economies are producing high-quality goods to sell in richer markets.3
Most of the existing trade literature with nonhomothetic preferences has relied on speci￿-
cations that take luxuries as an exogenous category, like hierarchical or ￿0/1￿preferences.4 An
implication of this exogeneity of luxuries is the fact that they can only deliver hump-shaped
Engel curves. By contrast, our utility speci￿cation is able to let di⁄erent goods behave as lux-
uries at di⁄erent levels of income, and hence rationalise the highly non-monotonic shape that
observed Engel curves take, even after controlling for a number of factors such as consumers￿age
and households￿composition (for a short review of the ￿ndings about empirical Engel curves,
see Lewbel, 2006).
An exception to the above literature is a recent paper by Fajgelman, Grossman and Helpman
(2009), who provide a model of international trade with nonhomothetic preferences and di⁄eren-
tiated goods, which can be o⁄ered in several degrees of quality. Di⁄erent from our paper, their
production technology is the same for all types of goods. Hence, nonhomotheticity is unrelated
to the heterogeneous scope for quality upgrading across goods, which is a crucial point in our
model. Finally, our paper also relates to other contributions that study Ricardian trade models
with quality ladders for a continuum of di⁄erentiated types of goods, such as Taylor (1993),
Alcala (2009), and Benedetti Fasil and Borota (2009). All these contributions, however, use
homothetic speci￿cations of preferences.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the setup of the model. Section 3
presents the partial equilibrium consumer￿ s problem, illustrating the speci￿cities of the nonho-
motheticity of demand in our model. Section 4 computes the general equilibrium in the world
economy, and analyses the e⁄ects of uniform aggregate productivity growth, population growth
and income inequality within countries. Section 5 presents some illustrative empirical results
consistent with the main model￿ s predictions using cross-country trade data. Section 6 illustrates
our theory with a particular historical example. Section 7 concludes. The appendices contain
the omitted proofs and some additional algebraic derivations used in the main text.
3Brooks (2006) provides evidence similar to Verhoogen￿ s (2008) for Colombian manufacturing plants. The
same conclusion as Hallak and Schott (2009) follows from Fieler (2007), who reports that unit prices (a proxy for
quality) rise with the importer￿ s income per capita, even for goods from the same exporter and category.
4Further details on hierarchical preferences can be found in Bertola, Foellmi and Zweimuller (2006, pp. 302-
320). The ￿0/1￿speci￿cation of preferences is due to Foellmi, Hepenstrick and Zweimuller (2008).
52 Structure of the Model
We consider a world composed by two countries: the Home country and the Foreign country. For
brevity, hereafter we refer to the former as H and to the latter as F. These two economies share
a common commodity space, de￿ned along two distinct dimensions: horizontal and vertical.
The ￿rst dimension (horizontal) designates the di⁄erent types of goods (e.g., fruit products,
TVs, etc.). Di⁄erent goods are indexed by the letter v along the space V ￿ R : v 2 [0;1].
The second dimension (vertical) refers to the intrinsic quality of the good of each particular
type v (e.g., organic vs. non-organic fruit products, LCD TVs vs. cathode ray tube TVs, etc.).
For each good v 2 V, commodities are vertically ordered by the quality-index q belonging to
the set Q ￿ R : q 2 [1;1), where a higher q denotes a higher quality. The commodity space
is then given by the set V ￿ Q =[0;1] ￿ [1;1), and each commodity is identi￿ed by a pair
(v;q) 2 V ￿ Q.5
We assume that all commodities are tradable. Additionally, we assume there are no transport
costs and no tari⁄s a⁄ecting international trade.
2.1 Technology
In both H and F competitive ￿rms produce commodities based on linear production functions
in which labour represents their only variable input. Whenever it proves needed, hereafter we
adopt the following notation: unstarred symbols refer to H, starred ones to F. We let unit
labour requirements vary both across goods and across qualities of each good. Also, we let
unit labour requirements di⁄er across countries. In particular, in H the unit labour requirement
for commodity (v;q) 2 V ￿ Q is given by cvq = a(v)q￿(v)=￿, while in F is given by c￿
vq =
a￿ (v)q￿(v)=￿.
The parameter ￿ > 0 above denotes a world aggregate-productivity parameter, which can be
interpreted as the global technology frontier. The functions a(v) and a￿ (v) represent good-speci￿c
technological parameters, for H and F respectively, and we assume they may di⁄er between those
two economies. Finally, the function ￿(v) summarises the cost elasticity of quality upgrading for
5In our setup, di⁄erent goods should be then understood as groups of commodities that aim at satisfying
di⁄erent needs. On the other hand, di⁄erent qualities of a particular good refer to the extent (or degree) in which
the need is actually satis￿ed by the commodity. In that regard, food satis￿es a di⁄erent need when compared to
TVs (physiological nutrition vs. visual entertainment), but LCD TVs satisfy the need for visual entertainment
(objectively!) better than cathode ray tube TVs.
6each good v, which is assumed to be the same for both H and F. Henceforth, we suppose that
a(v) : [0;1] ! R++, where a0 (￿) ￿ 0; analogously, a￿ (v) : [0;1] ! R++, where a￿0 (￿) ￿ 0. We
also assume that ￿ (v) : [0;1] ! R++, where ￿0 (￿) > 0 and ￿ (0) > 1.6
In our world economy, each country will naturally specialise in those commodities they can
produce more cheaply. As a result, the international price of each commodity will be given




, where w (w￿) denotes the wage in H (F), measured in a common
numeraire. Given the unit labour requirements in the two countries speci￿ed above, we can
express the international price of each commodity (v;q) 2 V ￿ Q as follows:
pvq = ￿(v)q￿(v)=￿; (1)
where ￿(v) ￿ minfa(v)w;a￿ (v)w￿g.
2.2 Preferences and Budget Constraint
Both H and F are inhabited by a continuum of individuals with identical preferences de￿ned
over the commodity space V ￿ Q.
We assume that individuals consume only one quality, denoted by qv, of each type of good
v. Let xv 2 R+ denote the consumed quantity of commodity qv (i.e., the consumed quantity
of good v in quality q) by a representative individual from H. This individual￿ s preferences are









xv if xv < 1
(xv)
qv if xv ￿ 1
(2)
where Cv represents a quality-adjusted consumption index.7
6From the labour requirements functions it is apparent that qualitative upgrade is costly, which seems a
natural assumption to make. Additionally, from our assumptions it follows that ￿ (v) > 1 for all v 2 V, which
implies that the marginal cost of improving quality is, for each good, increasing along the quality space. In
that sense, this assumption also seems quite natural, as it re￿ ects the fact that subsequent quality improvements
become increasingly costly. Finally, note that ￿
0 (￿) > 0, coupled with a
0 (￿) ￿ 0, implies that goods are sorted
along the space V by their cost of quality upgrading.
7The assumption of a single consumed quality for each good is posed to ease our exposition, and it corresponds
to the solution that arises when assuming an in￿nite degree of substitution between qualities of the same goods.










dv, where xvq denotes the consumed quantity of commodity (v;q) 2 V ￿ Q.
7The utility function captures the notion that quality is a desirable feature, and that quality
turns increasingly desirable as physical consumption rises. Notice that quality magni￿es the
utility derived from (physical) consumption only when xv > 1. This last property of (2) intends
to capture the idea that individuals ￿rst seek to satisfy their basic consumption needs, and just
after these basic needs are met, do they start paying attention to the quality dimension of the
goods they consume.
Some additional properties about the utility function speci￿ed in (2) are worth noting. First,
for each good v, marginal utility is unbounded above as consumption approaches zero, implying
that all goods will be actively consumed in an optimum. Second, considering the hypothetical
consumed quantities, xvq and xvq, of two di⁄erent levels of the quality-index, q < q, for the same
good v, the marginal rate of substitution of xvq for xvq is non-decreasing along a proportional
expansion path of xvq and xvq.8 This last property of (2) allows demand functions to display
nonhomothetic behaviour, where the rich spend a larger fraction of their income in higher-
qualities than the poor.
Each individual is endowed with one unit of e⁄ective labour, which is supplied inelastically.
Labour is immobile across countries. As a result, each individual in H supplies his entire labour
endowment to domestic ￿rms in return of a wage w 2 R++. This wage represents the only
source of income for the individual. Therefore, his budget constraint reads as follows:
Z
V
pv xv dv ￿ w (3)
where pv 2 R++ denotes the (international) price of each unit of good qv.
We de￿ne ￿v ￿ pvxv=w as the demand intensity of good v 2 V.9 In the optimum, given the
speci￿cation in (2), the budget constraint (3) will naturally bind. It is thus straightforward to
notice that demand intensities will sum up to one across goods (i.e.,
R
V ￿vdv = 1).
All individuals in the world face the same prices for the reproducible commodities. As a
result, the analogous expressions in (2) and (3) corresponding to F read, respectively, as follows:
8To see this, note the MRS(xvq;xvq) is de￿ned by (@U=@xvq)=(@U=@xvq) and, along a proportional expansion









from where it is clear that, along the ray xvq = k xvq; MRS(xvq;xvq) is increasing in xvq.
9Demand intensities are the continuous counterpart of the discrete-case expenditure shares. Their relationship













vdv ￿ w￿. (Bear in mind that, since labour is immobile,
w and w￿ need not be equal.)
3 The Individual￿ s Optimal Consumption Choice
In this section we present the optimal consumption choice of a representative individual from
H, given the set of prices in the world economy. The results so obtained can be easily extended
to an individual from F, which is done in Appendix B.
Before stating the consumer￿ s optimisation problem, it proves convenient to state the follow-
ing preliminary result:
qv > 1 ) xv > 1: (4)
This result follows immediately from noting that, for all v 2 V, utility derived from consum-
ing xv 2 (0;1] is independent of the consumed quality qv, while according to (1) the price of
commodity qv is strictly increasing along the quality space. Given (4), we may then restate the
quality-adjusted consumption index in (2) simply as: Cv = (xv)
qv.
Bearing in mind result (4) and the fact that xv = w￿v=pv, the individual￿ s optimisation
















qv ￿ 1; 8v 2 V;
pv = ￿(v)(qv)
￿(v) =￿; 8v 2 V:
(5)
The ￿rst-order conditions corresponding to (5) are stated in the Appendix A. From those
￿rst-order conditions we may obtain the following expression for each ￿v in the optimum:
￿v = qv=Q; 8v 2 V; (6)
where Q ￿
R
V qzdz can be regarded as an aggregate index measuring the optimal consumption
bundle￿ s average quality. Notice that, according to (6), the fraction of income spent on good v is
determined by its optimal quality relative to the average quality of consumption. In that regard,
if all goods were optimally consumed at identical quality degrees (i.e., if qv = Q, 8v 2 V), then
￿v = 1 would hold for all v 2 V, and our model would behave exactly as the one by Dornbusch,
Fischer and Samuelson (1977).
93.1 Distribution of Qualities and Demand Intensities across Goods
Given the technology in the world economy, summarised by ￿; ￿(￿) and ￿ (￿), it is possible to
characterise the distribution of the optimal qualities across goods according to their position
within the set V. Lemma 1 provides the ￿rst result in that direction.
Lemma 1
Consider two goods v;v 2 V, such that v < v. Then: qv ￿ qv; with strict inequality i⁄ qv > 1.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Lemma 1 implies that the consumed quality qv is non-increasing in the good-index v. The
underlying intuition for Lemma 1 is straightforward: those goods which can be more cheaply
upgraded tend to be optimally consumed in higher quality degrees.
The monotonicity of qv implied by Lemma 1 allows us to split the goods space in two disjoint
subsets. The ￿rst subset containing goods that are bound to be consumed at the baseline quality
(i.e., qv = 1) ￿these are the higher-indexed goods. The second one comprising the goods for
which the constraint qv ￿ 1 in (5) does not bind in the optimum ￿these are the lower-indexed
goods. Henceforth, we denote the second subset by L ￿ V.
Lastly, regarding the distribution of the demand intensities, from the condition in (6) we can
observe that, in the optimum, demand intensities are set proportional to the optimal qualities.
As a result, the distribution of ￿v across goods will qualitatively mirror that of qv.
3.2 E⁄ects of Aggregate Productivity Growth on Demand
In this section we study the e⁄ects of letting the parameter ￿ vary, while holding unchanged
the functions a(￿), a￿ (￿) and ￿ (￿), along with w and w￿. The consequence of this is letting the
consumer￿ s real income increase, without altering any of the relative prices of commodities in
the space V ￿ Q.
For su¢ ciently low levels of aggregate productivity, the subset of goods consumed at the
baseline quality initially comprises the entire set V; formally, L = ; holds when ￿ is below the
threshold ￿ ￿ a(0)exp(￿ (0)). As world aggregate productivity rises beyond the threshold ￿,
the subset L starts expanding, and eventually L = V holds when ￿ is su¢ ciently large.10
The next lemma complements Lemma 1 and describes in further detail how optimal qualities
evolve as the parameter ￿ changes.
10For a formal proof of these results, see Lemma 3 in Appendix D.
10Lemma 2
Let L = fv 2 V : ￿v = 0g, where ￿v is the Lagrange multiplier associated to the constraint qv ￿ 1.
Consider two goods v;v 2 V, such that v < v. Then:
i) 8￿ 2 (0;￿) ) @qv=@￿ = @qv=@￿ = 0;
ii) 8￿ ￿ ￿ ) @qv=@￿ ￿ @qv=@￿; with strict inequality if v 2 L.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Lemma 2 shows that, whenever L is non-empty (i.e., case ii in the lemma), for all goods
belonging to L the consumed quality increases when world aggregate productivity rises. Fur-
thermore, this e⁄ect is stronger for those goods whose quality can be more cheaply upgraded
￿i.e., those goods carrying a lower ￿ (v). On the other hand, we can observe that the optimal
quality of goods that do not belong to L does not respond to (in￿nitesimal) changes in ￿.
We can accordingly identify two distinct regimes depending on the level of ￿ that prevails.
First, we refer to an economy with ￿ ￿ ￿ as a subsistence economy. In a subsistence economy,
all goods are consumed at the baseline quality. Second, we refer to an economy with ￿ > ￿ as
a modern economy. In a modern economy some goods (and possibly all of them) are consumed
strictly above the baseline quality.
In what follows we proceed to further characterise these two regimes.
Subsistence Economy: ￿ ￿ ￿
In this regime, qv = 1 holds for all v 2 V. This in turn means that Q = 1 and ￿v = 1
must hold for all v 2 V as well. Thus, in a subsistence economy demand intensities remain
constant and equal to one for all goods as ￿ increases.11 In that regard, a subsistence economy
displays analogous behaviour to the economy discussed in Dornbusch et al (1977), where demand
schedules are homothetic across types of goods.
Modern Economy: ￿ > ￿
This regime is characterised by qv > 1 for all v 2 [0; ~ v(￿)), where ~ v(￿) denotes the threshold
v 2 V such that qv > 1 for all v < ~ v(￿). Hence, the average quality can be written as Q =
1 ￿ ~ v (￿) +
R ~ v(￿)
0 qz dz, from where it follows that @Q=@￿ =
R ~ v(￿)
0 (@qz=@￿) dz > 0. Since
@qv=@￿ = 0 for all v = 2 L, then because of (6), @￿v=@￿ < 0 must hold for all v = 2 L. As a
11It must be noted that this result applies only if ￿ ￿ ￿ holds after performing the comparative statics exercise.
11result, given that
R
V ￿v dv = 1, it must thus be the case that the demand intensities of some
(and possibly all) v 2 L will increase as ￿ rises. Henceforth, let J ￿ V denote the subset of V
comprising all those goods for which @￿v=@￿ > 0.
In a subsistence economy, J = ;, while in a modern economy, J 6= ;. In other words, in a
modern economy the homotheticity of demand intensities across goods no longer holds, as a
subset of goods whose income demand elasticity is larger than one shows up. Notice, too, that
J ￿ L, since @qv=@￿ > 0 is a necessary condition for @￿v=@￿ > 0 to hold.
The next proposition further characterises the behaviour of the demand intensities, ￿v, as ￿
rises.
Proposition 1
Let J =fv 2 V : @￿v=@￿ > 0g. Consider two goods v;v 2 V, such that v < v. Then:
i) 8￿ 2 (0;￿) ) @￿v=@￿ = @￿v=@￿ = 0;
ii) 8￿ ￿ ￿ ) @￿v=@￿ ￿ @￿v=@￿; with strict inequality if v 2 J
Proof. See Appendix C.
To interpret our previous results more clearly, notice that J may be understood as the set
of luxury goods, where by luxury goods we refer to those goods whose income demand elasticity
is larger than 1. Since the set J always comprises lower-indexed goods, the luxury goods are
exactly those goods whose quality qv is relatively high compared to the average quality Q: In
that regard, in our model it is the (relative) quality that determines whether or not a particular
goods is luxurious.
Figure 1 illustrates this feature graphically. The distributions of qualities and demand in-
tensities across goods are drawn for four di⁄erent levels of world aggregate-productivity (￿0 ￿
￿ < ￿1 < ￿2 < ￿3). When individuals are still poor (i.e., for a level of productivity ￿0 ￿ ￿),
satisfying all basic needs constitutes their main goal, leading them to keep the quality of all
goods at the baseline and setting accordingly equal demand intensities for all goods. As indi-
viduals become richer, some goods ￿ for a level of productivity ￿1 2 (￿0;￿2)￿ and eventually
all goods ￿ for a level of productivity ￿3 ￿ ￿2￿ are consumed in higher qualities. As a result,
for those three levels of ￿, a subset of goods with ￿v > 1 appears in the lower spectrum of the
(unit) goods set. Additionally, the goods whose quality is relatively higher attract increasingly
larger income shares, as given the preference speci￿cation in (2) individuals tend to value high-
quality commodities relatively more as they become wealthier. This last point is formalised in
the following corollary.

















0 ￿z dz. Then:
(i) 8￿ 2 (0;￿) ) @#(v)=@￿ = 0; 8v 2 V;
(ii) 8￿ ￿ ￿ ) @#(v)=@￿ ￿ 0; 8v 2 V; with strict inequality if v < 1.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Corollary 1 synthesizes the eventual nonhomothetic behaviour of the demand schedules im-
plied by our model. More precisely, whenever ￿ < ￿, demand schedules are homothetic across
goods. However, when ￿ lies above the threshold ￿, income starts being spent in growing
proportion on lower-indexed goods.
4 General Equilibrium in the World Economy
In Section 3, we have studied the optimal consumption choice of an individual from H, taking
the wages in H and in F, w and w￿, as exogenously given. (In Appendix B, we do the same for
the case of an individual from F.) These wages in turn determine the prices of all reproducible
commodities in the world economy through equation (1). Our former analysis has therefore
yielded only partial equilibrium results.
13The present section computes the general equilibrium in this world economy. This requires
endogenising wages and, thereby, the prices of all reproducible commodities. Given that in a
general equilibrium only relative prices are determined, we henceforth take the wage in F as the
numeraire, by setting w￿ = 1.
So far we have not put any structure in terms of comparative advantage. The next assumption
dictates the pattern of comparative advantage across countries.
Assumption 1 Let A(v) ￿ a￿ (v)=a(v). We suppose: (i) A0 (v) < 0, and (ii) 9 v0 2 (0;1) :
A(v0) = 1.
Assumption 1 represents the only source of heterogeneity across countries in our model. In
particular, this last assumption implies that H enjoys a comparative advantage in the production
of lower-indexed commodities, while F has a comparative advantage in the production of upper-
indexed commodities.
Note that given the cost functions cvq and c￿
vq speci￿ed in section 2.1, because ￿ (v) is the
same for H and F, the nature of comparative advantage does not change as we move up in
the quality ladder.12 In that sense, in the model, the comparative advantage always refers to
particular goods, irrespective of the quality at which those goods are actually produced (for
example, a country that has a comparative advantage in producing fruit products, will have this
advantage both in organic and in non-organic fruit products).
From the international pricing equation (1) and Assumption 1, we can derive the marginal
good m (that is, the good that can be supplied by both countries at the same price), which
satis￿es:
A(m) = w=w￿: (7)
Equation (7) implies that, given the relative wage w=w￿, H will produce all the goods in the
interval [0;m] and F will produce all the goods within [m;1].
In order to allow countries to possibly display identical income per head in equilibrium (that
is, in order to remove any direct source of absolute advantage from the model), we pose the next
assumption, which formally states symmetry in terms of countries￿comparative advantage.
Assumption 2 (Symmetric comparative advantages) We suppose: v0 = 0:5.
12Letting ￿ (￿) vary across countries change in a similar fashion as a(￿) would not qualitatively alter the results
of the paper ￿ in fact, adding heterogeneity on ￿ (￿), on top of that on a(￿), would reinforce our ￿ndings.
14Additionally, to disregard the e⁄ects of heterogeneous population size in di⁄erent countries,
we initially suppose that both H and F are inhabited by a continuum of individuals with identical
mass, which we normalise to one. (We explore the general equilibrium e⁄ects of heterogenous
population size later on in Section 4.2.)



























￿v dv = 1; and qv ￿ 1; 8v 2 V:
(8)


































v dv = 1; and q￿
v ￿ 1; 8v 2 V:
(9)
The solution of (8) and (9) yields the demand functions of each good v 2 V by H and F,
respectively. By using #(v) ￿
R v




Corollary 2 in Appendix B), we can write the equilibrium condition for the market of goods
produced in H as follows:
#(m)w + #￿ (m) = w; (10)
where m is the marginal good as de￿ned by (7). Condition (10) essentially says that the aggregate
amount of income spent by the world in goods produced in H must be equal to the aggregate
income of H. This condition can also be understood as the equilibrium condition for the labour
market in H.13
The world economy general equilibrium is determined by (7), (8), (9), and (10). Henceforth,
we will focus our attention on the equilibrium values of w and m, and on how these two variables
respond to some comparative statics experiments commonly explored by the previous literature
on international trade with nonhomothetic preferences. Firstly, we analyse the general equilib-
rium consequences of uniform aggregate productivity growth in the world economy; this exercise
shows how our model can account for income divergence across countries with similar initial con-
ditions purely via the endogenous evolution of the terms of trade. Secondly, we investigate the
13Because of the Walras￿Law, an analogous condition can be derived for the equilibrium in the labour market
in F.
15e⁄ects of uneven population growth across countries, and illustrate how the country in which
population grows faster tends to experience a decline in its terms of trade and relative income.
Lastly, we look at the case of income inequality within countries, and discuss how inequality
tends to improve the terms of trade and the relative income of the economy that specialises in
producing goods that display higher income demand elasticity, regardless of whether inequality
arises in H or F.
4.1 Worldwide Uniform Aggregate Productivity Growth
In this subsection, we look at the impact of changes in ￿ on the equilibrium values of w and m.
We can split the results in two di⁄erent cases.
Subsistence economies: ￿ ￿ ￿
From our previous discussion, we can observe that when ￿ ￿ ￿, the optimal demand intensities
are set at ￿v = ￿￿
v = 1 for all v 2 V. This result in turn implies that #(m) = #￿ (m) = m.
Therefore, (10) simpli￿es to:
w = m=(1 ￿ m): (11)
Combining (7) with (11), leads to m=(1 ￿ m) = A(m), from where it follows that, for all ￿ ￿ ￿:
w = 1 and m = 0:5. That is, H and F exhibit the same level of income, and the pattern of
regional specialisation is accordingly dictated by the ￿natural￿comparative advantage of each
country without the relative-wage e⁄ect (i.e., those that derive purely from Assumption 1).14
Modern economies: ￿ > ￿
When aggregate productivity is su¢ ciently high, the income equality between H and F no longer
holds. In particular, as ￿ rises above the threshold ￿, the terms of trade start moving in favour
of H, and thus H becomes relatively richer than F. Moreover, the income disparity between H
and F further increases as ￿ keeps rising.
Proposition 2
Let ￿ > ￿. Then, in equilibrium:
14Notice that, since w = 1 for all ￿ ￿ ￿, in fact ￿ = ￿
￿ (that is, the threshold on ￿ that divides a subsistence-
economy from a modern economy happens to be the same for both H and F). As a consequence, we can refer to
both thresholds simply as ￿.
16(i) w > 1; m < 0:5;
(ii) @w=@￿ > 0; @m=@￿ < 0:
Proof.
Part (i). When ￿ > ￿, from Corollary 1 and 2 it follows that #(m) > m and #￿(m) > m. As a















, m < 0:5.
Finally, since m < 0:5, equation (7) implies that w > 1:
Part (ii). Next, to study how w and m vary as ￿ keeps rising above ￿, we di⁄erentiate the



































where the ￿rst term in (14) uses the fact that @#(m)=@m = ￿m and @#￿(m)=@m = ￿￿
m. Plugging





[1 ￿ #(m) ￿ w@#(m)=@w ￿ @#￿(m)=@w]A0(m) ￿ (w￿m + ￿￿
m)
: (15)
For determining the sign of (15), we can use the following two results: ￿rst, Corollary 1 states
that both @#(m)=@￿ > 0 and @#￿(m)=@￿ > 0; second, as shown in Appendix D, @#(m)=@w ￿ 0
and @#￿(m)=@w < 0. Therefore, since 1 ￿ #(m) > 0 and A0(m) < 0, then @m=@￿ < 0 obtains
from the right-hand side of (15). Finally, from (13) it then follows that @w=@￿ > 0.
Proposition 2 shows that as the world aggregate-productivity parameter, ￿, increases, the
income in H eventually begins diverging away from the income in F. The reason for the divergence
rests on the fact that H enjoys a comparative advantage in producing lower-indexed goods, which
tend to be consumed in relatively higher qualities and display accordingly higher income demand
elasticity. As a consequence, as the world productivity grows uniformly above ￿, aggregate world
17expenditure shifts towards the set of commodities produced by H. The ensuing excess demand
for commodities produced in H causes excess labour demand in H and w thus goes up. In turn,
as w rises, the marginal good moves to the left (i.e., m falls), and some of the goods that used to
be produced by H start being produced by F, restoring the equilibrium in the labour markets.
The endogenous emergence of income disparities in the absence of absolute advantage in this
two-country world economy represents the main result and novelty of our paper. Initially, H and
F display the same level of income per head. Although sectorial productivities do di⁄er across the
two countries and govern the patterns of regional specialisation, this heterogeneity does not prove
enough to warrant income disparities between H and F. This is because at low levels of worldwide
aggregate productivity the willingness to pay for high-quality commodities is not large enough
for tilting aggregate demand disproportionately towards the goods produced by H. However, in
a context where worldwide aggregate productivity rises, leading to higher incomes in both H
and F, goods exhibiting larger scope for quality upgrading become increasingly appreciated by
the consumers and, thus, start absorbing larger budget shares. Within a general equilibrium
framework, this mechanism implies that aggregate demand shifts towards H, inducing faster
income growth in H relative to F, via the secular tendency to improve H￿ s terms of trade.
Concerning the evolution of the world productive structure, the equilibrium adjustments
triggered by worldwide uniform productivity growth generates two types of product cycle phe-
nomena. First, the marginal good, m, shifts left: this is an international product cycle phenom-
enon involving both countries simultaneously, similar to that previously discussed by Linder
(1961) and Vernon (1966), where over time the production of lower-quality goods moves from
H to F, while H specialises in more sophisticated higher-quality goods. The second phenom-
enon occurs within each good and could be denoted regional product cycle, as it involves single
countries individually: rising world income leads both H and F to abandon the manufacturing
of lower-quality goods and replace them with the production of goods of higher quality (i.e., the
optimal qv tends to rise for all goods traded in the world economy as ￿ increases).
An immediate implication of the regional product cycle phenomenon is the fact that citizens
from H, who are richer than those from F, consume comparatively higher qualities for each good
traded in the international markets, i.e. qv ￿ q￿
v, 8v 2 V. This result is consistent with various
strands of empirical evidence. For instance, Verhoogen (2008) and Iacovone and Javorcik (2009)
show that Mexican manufacturing plants produce higher-quality versions of goods to export to
richer markets (mainly the US). Similar evidence is provided by Brooks (2006) for Colombian
manufacturing plants. A more general piece of evidence comes from Hallak and Schott (2009)
18who using cross-country data show that the quality gap in production between rich and poor
economies is smaller than their income gap, which suggests that poorer economies are producing
high-quality goods to sell in richer markets. The same conclusion follows from Fieler (2007) who
reports that unit prices (a proxy for quality) rise with the importer￿ s income per capita, even
for goods originating from the same exporter and commodity category.
As a ￿nal remark, notice that the proof of result (ii) in Proposition 2, which states that
wages rise and the marginal good shifts leftwards as world aggregate-productivity increases, does
not rely on Assumption 2 at any moment. In fact, both @w=@￿ > 0 and @m=@￿ < 0 would still
obtain if we instead gave a larger range of initial advantage to F by assuming that ￿0 < 0:5. If
￿0 < 0:5, somewhat richer dynamics would be obtained, though. More precisely, w < 1 would
hold for levels of worldwide productivity below a certain (￿nite) threshold b ￿ > ￿, while the
model would predict catching-up by H for values of ￿ 2 (￿;b ￿), followed next by overtaking and
divergence in an analogous fashion as it occurred when ￿0 = 0:5.
4.2 Uneven Population Growth
In this subsection we let the population size in F di⁄er from that in H. In particular, we let the
total mass of individuals in F equal L > 1, while we keep the total mass of individuals in H
equal to 1. Thus, the labour market equilibrium condition in H will be given by:
#(m)w + L#￿(m) = w: (16)
Visual inspection on (16) and (10), combined with (7), immediately implies that the equi-
librium value of w that is delivered by (16) will be strictly larger than that yielded by (10).
In particular, in equilibrium w > 1, regardless of the value of ￿. Furthermore, this source of
income disparity between F and H magni￿es as the value of L rises. This is because, when the
population in F increases, the relative wage w must go up so as to accommodate the excess
supply of labour in F. More precisely, a larger L requires more goods to be produced by F in
order to keep full employment there; this is accomplished by letting w go up, which in turn
shifts the marginal good m to the left, helping restore the equilibrium in the labour markets.
The result that, as the relative population of F increases, the H relative wage rises is in
line with the models in Flam and Helpman (1987), Stokey (1991) and Matsuyama (2000).
However, some interesting di⁄erences are also present. In Flam-Helpman and Stokey, although
the optimal bundle of goods traded in the market changes, no new goods actually appear in the
world economy as w rises due to uneven population growth in the world. In Matsuyama, new
19goods start being produced, but this happens only in the country whose population grows slower
(i.e., in H); the country whose population grows faster, F, does not introduce new goods into
the world markets, but only takes on the production of (some) goods that are abandoned by H
as w increases. In our model, new goods actually start being produced by F as its relative wage
decreases owing to faster population growth. A higher w brings about two di⁄erent e⁄ects: ￿rst,
individuals in H become richer (income e⁄ect); second, the relative prices of the goods originally
produced in F decline (substitution e⁄ect). Taken jointly, these two e⁄ects reinforce one another
and induce individuals from H to start demanding higher qualities for the goods produced in
F.15
4.3 Income Inequality within Countries
In this subsection we discuss the general equilibrium consequences of introducing some degree
of income heterogeneity within countries. Here, analogous qualitative results are generated
regardless of whether inequality is introduced in F or H (or in both at the same time). Therefore,
for brevity, in what follows we focus only on the ￿rst case.
Assume that F is inhabited by two types of individuals: p and r, where the p stands for
poor and r stands for rich. Each sub-group of individuals from F has mass equal to 0:5. The
di⁄erence between the two sub-groups lies in that a type p is endowed with a smaller amount
of e⁄ective labour than a type r. In particular, suppose that type-p individuals are endowed
with 1￿￿ units of e⁄ective labour and individuals in r are endowed with 1+￿ units of it, where
￿ 2 (0;1). On the other hand, in H everyone is endowed with the same amount of e⁄ective
labour. Introducing income inequality in the model leads to interesting results when the types
p are so poor that, in equilibrium, they consume all goods at the baseline quality level, whereas
in contrast the types r can a⁄ord consuming at least some of the goods strictly above that level.
To focus on such case, we accordingly set ￿ = ￿.
Introducing income inequality in F raises the relative wage in H. This is owing to the nonho-
motheticity of the demand schedules of the rich foreigners. More precisely, increasing ￿ transfers
income from the poor foreigners, who spend a fraction m of it in goods from H, to the rich
foreigners, who spend a fraction #￿
r(m) > m of their income on those commodities. As a result,
aggregate demand for goods produced in H rises, leading to higher w. Similarly, it is quite
15For example, our model then predicts that Africa will start to produce, say, organic bananas to sell in Europe,
as increasingly richer European consumers begin desiring to purchase higher-quality fruit products, which are
moreover becoming relatively cheaper over time as population in Africa grows faster than in Europe.
20straightforward to observe that incorporating inequality in H would carry similar consequences
on w and m. This is the case because the rich locals would tend to shift demand towards the
goods produced in H; exactly the same shift induced before by the presence of rich foreigners.
5 Length of Quality Ladders and Exports Behaviour: a brief
examination of the trade data
In this section, we conduct a few empirical exercises to assess whether the central predictions
of our model ￿nd some empirical support in the trade data. More speci￿cally, our aim is to
determine whether the exports, both at a world- and country-level of aggregation, correlate with
world income changes in a way that is consistent with our previous theoretical ￿ndings. For this
purpose, we propose two stylised reduced-form approaches to assess our predictions. The ￿rst
approach, illustrated in Section 5.2, looks at whether long-ladder goods attract increasing world
expenditure shares with rising world income. The second approach, illustrated in Section 5.3,
investigates whether exports from countries specialising in the production of long-ladder goods
increase relatively more when world income rises. Furthermore, we look at how economies￿initial
specialisation correlates with future exports growth in a context of world income growth, in the
attempt to investigate whether the initial pattern of specialisation may lead to uneven future
exports growth when goods di⁄er in their scope for quality upgrading.
5.1 The Length of Quality Ladders Across Goods
The ￿rst step is to construct a proxy for the length of quality ladders across a large set of di⁄er-
ent types of tradeable goods. We build two di⁄erent proxies based on measures of dispersion of
import unit prices using the data compiled by Feenstra et al (2005). This dataset documents bi-
lateral trade at the country level for the period 1962-2000 measured both in value and quantities,
organised following the 4-digit Standard International Trade Classi￿cation (SITC-4), Revision
2. From this dataset, we calculate the (average) import unit prices of each SITC-4 product by
each importer during the year 2000.16 As a result, we are able to obtain up to 182 di⁄erent unit
16We choose to calculate unit prices using only the year 2000 for two di⁄erent reasons. First, it avoids problems
that may arise from comparing unit prices at di⁄erent points in time. Second, and more importantly, using the
last year available seems the most promising one in terms of proxying the length of ladders according to the
nature of nonhomotheticities in our model. This is because the poorest country in 2000 was roughly as poor as
the poorest one in 1962, whereas the richest economy in 2000 was substantially richer than the richest one in
21prices (one for each importer) for each of the 749 di⁄erent goods in the SITC-4 categorisation.
In order to construct our ￿rst proxy for the length of quality ladders, we sort the (average)
import unit prices obtained for every importer, and pick the maximum and minimum for each of
the 749 goods in the SITC-4 categorisation. We next use these two boundary prices to compute
the max-to-min price ratio for every SITC-4 good. In that regard, unit prices of each SITC-4
good are taken as proxies for the intrinsic qualities of that particular good, and the max-to-min
price ratios are accordingly viewed as proxies for the length of quality ladders of goods.17
To obtain our second proxy for the length of quality ladders, we compute the coe¢ cients of
variation of the distribution of unit prices for each of the SITC-4 goods.18 The underlying idea
for this measure is that goods featuring longer quality ladders should, in general, also display a
more ￿ dispersed￿distribution of unit prices.19
In Table 1 we group all the SITC-4 sectors/goods into their corresponding 1-digit sector.
Therein we report the average values of the max-to-min unit price ratios and the average values
of coe¢ cients of variation of unit prices. With the exception of sector 2, Table 1 seems to point
to the common perception that the quality ladders of primary goods tend to be shorter than
those of manufacturing products (i.e. sectors 5 to 8). Sector 9, which contains only 5 products
in the SITC-4 classi￿cation, appears to be an outlier when compared to the other sectors.
1962. (In 1962 the poorest and richest economies were Guinnea Bissau and Switzerland with GDP per head 417
and 19512, respectively, measured in PPP 2005 US dollars. In 2000, the poorest was Zaire with GDP per capita
equal to 312 and the richest was Luxemburg with 63419, both measured in PPP 2005 US dollars.)
17In order to mitigate the e⁄ect of outliers and measurement errors, when computing the max-to-min price
ratios we clean the data on unit prices along two di⁄erent dimensions: i) we disregard unit prices from importers
whose reported import quantities of those particular SITC-4 goods equals 1; ii) we disregard the lowest price
when the second-lowest recorded unit price is more than 100% larger than the former and, similarly, we disregard
the highest price if this one more than doubles the second-highest recorded unit price (when this occurs, we utilise
the second-lowest or second-highest unit prices to build the extreme price ratios).
18In this case, we also clean the data of import unit prices following the same two procedures stated in the
previous footnote.
19As mentioned previously in the Introduction, unit prices/values have been used before as proxies of quality
in the empirical trade literature: e.g., Schott (2004), Hallak (2006), Fieler (2007). Of course, unit prices/values
should only be taken as an imperfect proxy of the intrinsic quality of the commodity, since factors other than
quality may also be a⁄ecting unit prices (for example, the degree of horizontal di⁄erentiation across industries,
heterogeneous transport costs, trade tari⁄s).
22Table 1: Averages at 1-digit level of disaggregation
Number of Average of Average of
products in max-to-min coeff. of variation
SITC-4 classif. unit price ratios of unit prices
0 - Food and live animals 93 46.7 0.711
1 - Beverages and tobacco 11 25.1 0.656
2 - Crude materials, inedible, except fuels 101 134.6 1.084
3 - Mineral fuels, lubricants and rel. materials 20 44.6 0.876
4 - Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes 18 11.8 0.526
5 - Chemicals and related products 91 177.8 1.024
6 - Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material 175 102.7 0.952
7 - Machinery and transport equipment 157 186.1 0.919
8 - Miscellaneous manufactured articles 78 100.8 0.887
9 - Commodities and trans. not classified elsewhere 5 1450.7 2.309
ALL GOODS 749 130.6 0.927
SITC-1 Sector
5.2 Cross-Good Regressions
One of the main predictions of our model is that goods with lower cost of quality upgrading tend
to feature longer quality ladders and exhibit higher income demand elasticities. As a result, long-
ladder goods will tend to attract increasing world expenditure shares with rising world income.
We assess this prediction on a reduced-form approach by running the following regression:
￿Xj;t = ￿ + ￿ (￿Yw;t ￿ Ladderj) + ￿t + "j;t; (17)
where ￿Xj;t is the percentage growth of the total value of world exports (and imports) of
good j in year t, ￿Yw;t is the percentage growth of world income per head in year t, and the
variable Ladderj denotes the length of the quality ladder of good j. Our model thus predicts
￿ > 0 because goods with larger scope for quality upgrading should also display higher income
demand elasticities. Notice that since (17) includes year ￿xed e⁄ects (￿t), we do not need to
include ￿Yw;t as another independent variable because such e⁄ect will be fully captured by each
￿t (more precisely, ￿Yw;t and ￿t are perfectly colinear).
Table 2 displays the results of the cross-good regressions. The regressions using ￿ interaction
term version 1￿are run with the length of ladder being proxied by the max-to-min unit price
ratios. In the ￿rst column we use all the 4-digit goods. Column (2) removes petroleum related
goods (all goods coded 3300 through to 3400 in the dataset) in case these goods have a particular
in￿ uence on the results for reasons other than nonhomotheticity linked to heterogeneity in the
scope of quality di⁄erentiation (for example, petroleum related goods may display relatively high
income demand elasticity not necessarily because they exhibit long quality ladders, but because
23they may represent fundamental inputs in the production of long-ladder goods). Column (3)
removes all ￿ve goods in ￿ Commodities and transactions not classi￿ed elsewhere￿as they seem
to be clear outliers according to Table 1. In the three cases, results are consistent with our
model￿ s prediction and all the estimates of ￿ are signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero at 10% level.
Similar conclusions (at somewhat higher signi￿cance levels) follow from regressions in columns
(4)-(6), where the length of ladder is proxied by the coe¢ cients of variation of unit prices.20
Finally, in columns (7) and (8) we run regression (17) using only sectors producing primary
goods (excluding again petroleum related goods). Column (7) seems to suggest that the link
between scope of quality upgrading (proxied by the max-to-min price ratios) and income demand
elasticity is also present when we look only at primary goods; in (8) the coe¢ cient is also
positive although it fails to reach signi￿cance at 10% level. This last result may suggest that our
mechanism might be relevant not only when comparing manufacturing versus agricultural goods,
as the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis has been traditionally presented in the North-South literature.
In particular, our model may also apply to cases in which the patterns of specialisation are not
strictly linked to di⁄erent stages of economic development.21
5.3 Cross-Country Regressions
Our model also predicts that countries that specialise in the production of goods with longer
quality ladders should see their exports value increase more strongly when world income rises.
We assess this prediction resorting again to a reduced-form approach by conducting the following
regression:
￿Xi;t = ￿ + ￿ (￿Yw;t ￿ Ladderi;t) + ￿t + ￿i + ￿i;t; (18)
20Notice that since (17) is capturing a reduced-form correlation between the variables placed in the regression,
the product (￿ ￿ Ladderj) cannot actually be interpreted as a component of the income demand elasticity of
good j. More precisely, to estimate such elasticity we would ￿rst need to abstract from all general equilibrium
interactions that take place when international prices adjust to income shocks (in terms of our general equilibrium
model, we would need to remove the e⁄ects brought about by the changes of w resulting from variations in ￿).
Nevertheless, our general equilibrium model still predicts a positive correlation between changes in the value of
exports of good j and its ladder￿ s length in a context of positive world income growth, which is the correlation
we aim to capture with (17).
21An illustrative example of how our model can be applied to rationalise patterns of specialisation of countries
at similar stages of economic development is presented next in Section 6, where we discuss the case of colonial
Jamaica and compare it to the one of pre-industrial Argentina.
24where ￿Xi;t is the percentage growth of the total value of exports by country i in year t. The
variable Ladderi;t measures the average length of ladders of the bundle of goods exported by
i in year t: we build this variable by weighing Ladderj (i.e., the variable used before in our
cross-good regressions) of each good j by the share of that good in the total value of exports of
country i in period t. Our model thus predicts ￿ > 0.
Columns (1)-(5) in Table 3 show the results of di⁄erent versions of (18) when we measure
the length of ladders by the max-to-min unit price ratios. Column (1) and (2) use all countries
in the panel, the former including country ￿xed e⁄ects and the latter excluding them: in both
cases the estimates are positive, similar in magnitude, and highly signi￿cant. In (3) we exclude
countries from the OPEC from the regression in case oil exporters may have a large impact on
the results (in particular, given that our sample includes years when the oil shocks occurred);
the previous results remain essentially intact. Results also remain unchanged when we exclude
Latin American economies from the sample in column (4) ￿in this case, the rationale is the
fact that many of these economies have gone through severe macroeconomic and external crises
during ￿ 80s and ￿ 90s, including large devaluations of their currencies. Finally, in (5) we exclude
the OECD countries to have some feeling about whether our results are crucially driven by
comparing developed economies to less developed ones; as we can readily observe, results still
remain essentially una⁄ected when we restrict the sample in such a way.
In columns (6)-(10) we replicate the same regressions using the coe¢ cients of variation of
unit prices. Although the signi￿cance of the estimates is lower than in (1)-(5), and in (6) and
(7) we fail to reach signi￿cance at 10% level, all the estimates carry the expected sign and,
moreover, their magnitudes exhibit a similar pattern to those in (1)-(5).
Viewed from a longer run perspective, our model argues that, if countries￿ comparative
advantages across goods remain constant over time, the initial pattern of specialisation may
lead to uneven future exports growth when goods di⁄er in their scope for quality upgrading.
Table 4 looks at how economies￿initial specialisation correlates with future exports growth in
a context of positive world income growth. In particular, we are interested in investigating
whether, when focusing on periods of positive world income growth, countries that initially
specialise in goods with longer quality ladders will tend to experience a higher rate of growth of
their exports. For this purpose, we build a proxy for country i initial specialisation ￿ in terms















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































26Table 4: Future exports growth regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Initial ladder length (1962-66) version 1 3.91 4.58 5.22 5.21
( 2.48)** (2.70)*** (2.50)** (2.42)**
Initial ladder length (1962-66) version 2 1.40 2.87 2.80 2.50
(1.18) (2.36)** (2.22)** (2.05)**
Excludes OPEC countries NO YES YES YES NO YES YES YES
Excludes Latin American countries NO NO YES YES NO NO YES YES
Excludes OECD countries NO NO NO YES NO NO NO YES
Observations 140 129 114 89 140 129 114 89
R - Squared 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.03
Initial ladder length version 1 uses the max-to-min unit price ratios (divided by 1000) to proxy for length of ladder of SITC-4 products, weighting
these ratios by the average exports shares of each product during years 1962-66. Initial ladder length version 2 uses the coeffients of variation of unit prices.
Dependent variable is the average growth of total exports by each country during years in the sample in which world income per head displays positive growth.
Robust t-statistics in parentheses. All regressions include a constant term. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Average growth of exports using years of positive world income growth
Sample: years 1971-2000
by their average export shares during years 1962-66. Notice that, although we use the ￿rst ￿ve
years in the sample for the export-share weights, the length of ladders for each SITC-4 good are
still being proxied by the max-to-min price during the last year in the sample (i.e. year 2000).
This is in line with the logic of our model, where goods￿potential of quality upgrading is the
feature that really matters for long-run exports growth, and the process of quality upgrading
itself materialises over time as world productivity expands and world income rises accordingly.
In Table 4 we take the subsample of years in the period 1971-2000, and we compute the
average growth of exports of each country, using only years in which world income per head
growth was positive. Next, we regress those average growth rates on countries￿initial length of
ladder, which are built as explained in the above paragraph. As for Table 3, we run regressions
including all countries in the sample, and subsequently excluding OPEC, Latin American and
OECD countries, in that order. All the regressions (except for column 5) reach the same conclu-
sion: the patterns of specialisation during the ￿rst ￿ve years in the sample (in terms of average
length of ladders of exports during 1962-66) correlates signi￿cantly with the average growth of
future exports during years of positive world income growth. (We ran the same regressions using
the subsample 1981-2000; the results obtained are qualitatively similar to those in Table 4 and
are available from the authors upon request.)22
22All regressions in Table 3 and Table 4 include sector 9 of the 1-digit SITC categorisation. Results obtained
excluding goods in sector 9 are very similar to those presented before, and are available upon request.
276 An Illustrative Historical Example: colonial Jamaica and
pre-industrial Argentina
Situations where the mechanism proposed in this paper may have played an important role
include the cases of economies for which exogenous initial geographical conditions greatly in￿ u-
enced their specialisation in the world economy during some period in history. As an illustrative
example, we take the case of colonial Jamaica (denoted by J) and compare it to the one of
pre-industrial Argentina (denoted by A). In this example, we consider two goods, namely sugar
(denoted by s) and beef (denoted by b).
From the second half of the XVII century until the ￿rst half of the XIX century, the Jamaican
economy grew mainly based on the production and export of sugar from sugarcane. This is not
surprising given the excellent climatic conditions this tropical island o⁄ered for that type of crop.
By 1805, Jamaica was the largest sugar exporter in the world (Higman, 2005). Given the value
attributed to sugar by European consumers, during that period Jamaica was deemed probably
the most important British colony in the Americas (Hall, 1959; Sheridan, 1973). Although sugar
was indeed a very valuable consumption good at that time, it clearly was a type of good with
very limited scope for undergoing subsequent improvements in quality. As such, according to
our model, sugar was bound to eventually lose its status of luxury among consumers as their
incomes would rise.23 In fact, by the second half of the XIX century, sugar began to lose its
economic preeminence in the world markets and started experiencing a long phase of declining
(relative) prices, which in turn seriously damaged the Jamaican economy.24
In Argentina, geographical conditions made this country exceptionally apt for the breeding
of cattle and growing cereals, which constituted the main engines of its economy until 1914.
The commercial production of cattle started in the late second half of the XVIII century with
the appearance of the saladeros ￿slaughterhouses where meat would be cured by drying and
salting (Newton, 1966). Salt-cured beef was a rather unsophisticated product that was mostly
23In that regard, Sheridan (1973) writes, "Until the late years of the 17th century English sugar consumption
seems to have been con￿ned rather closely to the wealthy sections of society. [...] Lower income groups were
reported to have used quantities of molasses, treacle and low-quality sugar to sweeten their eatables, and to make
drinkable liquors. [...] During the 18th century the [physical] demand for sugar grew so rapidly among all sections
of English society that few people considered it a luxury [anymore]."
24By 1820 the GDP per head in Jamaica was 1.05 times the world average GDP per head, whereas by 1870 it
equalled 0.61 the world average GDP per head. In fact, during the period 1820-1870, income per head in Jamaica
fell 23.6%, while the world average income per head grew 31%. Data taken from Maddison (2008).
28exported to Cuba and Brazil to feed slaves. In fact, the industry of the saladeros did not mean
a big push to the Argentinean economy, which was at that time still a very marginal country
within the world economy.
The big boom for the cattle industry in Argentina came much later, at the end of the XIX
century. Unlike the sugar industry, the cattle industry had some scope for quality upgrad-
ing, in the form of chilled and frozen beef. The market size for this product, certainly more
appreciated by consumers than salt-cured beef, was however initially quite limited, since the
transportation cost induced a huge di⁄erential in the prices of the two goods. Yet, in Europe,
incomes had been continuously rising during the XIX century, thanks to the massive technolog-
ical advancement that followed the advent of the Industrial Revolution. The availability of a
higher-quality commodity in the cattle industry eventually attracted well-to-do European con-
sumers, whose demand induced Argentinean ￿rms to export large amounts of chilled and frozen
beef to Europe.25 During the period 1890-1914, Argentina grew on average at rate of 5.5%
yearly, attracted millions of immigrants from Europe and became one of the richest countries in
the world (Maddison, 2008).26 The exportation of chilled and frozen beef was undoubtedly one
of the main activities that spurred this phase of fast and steady economic growth in Argentina
between 1880-1914 (Rapaport, 1988).
This example illustrates how exogenous geographical conditions greatly in￿ uenced the path of
GDP growth in Jamaica and in Argentina via the evolution of their exports, in the way our model
would predict. Jamaica was comparatively e¢ cient at producing sugar, while Argentina enjoyed





Sugar o⁄ered very limited scope for quality improvements, which is analogous to assuming that
the cost of quality upgrading for sugar products is extremely high. On the contrary, beef did
o⁄er some more scope for quality upgrading than sugar (in our model, ￿b < ￿s). The latter
materialised in the switch from salt-cured beef production (lower-quality commodity) to chilled
and frozen beef (higher-quality commodity). As predicted by our model, sugar exports initially
sustained high growth in Jamaica, until rising income in the world (i.e., driven by rising ￿)
shifted aggregate world expenditure towards goods which could be o⁄ered in higher quality
25The main market for Argentinean chilled and frozen beef at that time was by far the prosperous Great
Britain of end of XIX and beginning of XX century (in 1914, 83.5% of the total Argentinean exports of chilled
and frozen beef was sent to the UK). See Rapaport (1988).
26By 1913, the GDP per head in Argentina was slightly larger than that of France and Germany, and it was
0.77 times the GDP per head in the UK. Data taken from Maddison (2008).
29degrees, such as chilled and frozen beef from Argentina.27
7 Conclusion
We have proposed a model of international trade with nonhomothetic preferences based on
comparative advantages that are unrelated to the stage in the process of development in which
countries are. This feature represents the main point of departure with respect to the past
literature on North-South trade, where the comparative advantage stems from the fact that
some countries (the North) have historically accumulated larger amounts of capital than others
(the South).
The key novel ￿nding of our model is pointing out that even when no single country enjoys
a clear absolute advantage over any other country and productivity changes are uniform and
identical in all countries, international trade may still be the source of income divergence in
the world economy when nonhomothetic preferences and quality ladders are jointly taken into
account. In particular, countries￿ incomes will diverge when comparative advantage induce
patterns of specialisation that, although optimal for each country at early stages in the process
of development, do not o⁄er the same scope for improvements in terms of quality upgrading of
￿nal products in the long run.
Our model also points out that worldwide uniform productivity growth generates two dis-
tinct types of product cycle phenomena. The ￿rst is an international product cycle phenomenon
￿ la Linder-Vernon, where over time one economy takes on the production of goods previously
produced by another economy. The second ￿which is novel to our model ￿is a regional prod-
uct cycle that occurs within each good and within each economy: rising world income makes
all economies engage in the production of newer goods of higher quality (so as to satisfy the
increasing demand for high qualities by wealthier consumers).
Admittedly, we have presented a largely stylised model, simpli￿ed in several dimensions, so
as to illustrate in a concise way our main mechanism and its implications: the fact that the dy-
27One may argue that the productivity improvement discussed in the illustrative example should be read as
a rise in good-speci￿c productivity (in our model, a fall in ab) rather than an increase in aggregate productivity.
Even if we supposed that was the case, a mere change in this parameter would not necessarily rationalise the
facts illustrated in this example, as the way total expenditure shares in good b would respond to a change in ab
crucially depends on the price elasticity of beef demand. Therefore, variations in ab would not necessarily a⁄ect
the relative terms of trade between the two countries in such a way as to account for the increase in per-capita
Argentinean income relative to Jamaican observed in historical data.
30namics of quality upgrading in consumption, in a context of worldwide growth and international
trade, may cause world demand to continuously shift towards those economies that produce
commodities o⁄ering larger scope for quality improvements. This result may hold, nonetheless,
under more general assumptions regarding preferences and technology, some of them already
discussed in previous sections.
Concerning preferences, the essential feature is that the marginal utility of quality upgrading
rises with income fast enough relative to the marginal cost of quality upgrading. With respect
to the technology itself, somewhat restrictive assumptions such as: (i) the monotonicity of A(v)
in Assumption 1 or (ii) the fact that functions a(v) and a￿(v) are both increasing in v, could
be relaxed. A non-monotonic A(v) will certainly lead to richer general equilibrium responses
to worldwide technological growth. Yet, the key ￿nding that the economy specialising in the
goods with lowest cost of quality upgrading will eventually experience faster growth through the
improvement of its terms of trade would still obtain. On the other hand, letting a(v) and a￿(v)
behave in an unrestricted way may give rise to changes and switches in the order of quality
upgrading across goods. However, again, the goods with relatively low elasticity of quality
upgrading, i.e. those with relatively low ￿(v), will eventually become those that experience
relatively fast quality upgrading, just as it occurred in our benchmark model.
We conducted a number of empirical exercises which suggest that the central theoretical
predictions of our model ￿nd some empirical support in the trade data. In particular, we ￿nd
that exports, both at a world- and country-level of aggregation, correlate with world income
changes in a way that is consistent with our theory. Our tests followed two stylised reduced-
form approaches. The ￿rst approach shows that long-ladder goods tend to attract increasing
world expenditure shares with rising world income. The second approach shows that exports
from countries specialising in the production of long-ladder goods increase relatively more when
world income rises. In addition, our ￿nding that economies￿initial specialisation correlates with
future exports growth in a context of world income growth is suggestive of the fact that initial
comparative advantage may lead to uneven future exports growth when goods di⁄er in their
scope for quality upgrading.
Finally, here, we have focused on illustrating how our theory may shed light on historical
cases where comparative advantage emerged exogenously, for example as a result of geographical
conditions. Other issues, including what determines the relative successes of economies with
similar comparative advantage, and why richer countries tend to trade among themselves more
than they do with poorer economies, are the subject of ongoing research.
31Appendices
A First-Order Conditions for Consumption Choice in H
The optimisation problem in (5) yields the following ￿rst-order conditions (where ￿ represents
the Lagrange multiplier associated to the budget constraint and f￿vgv2V denote those associated








￿ ￿ (v) + ￿v = 0; 8v 2 V; (19)
qv
￿v
￿ ￿ = 0; 8v 2 V; (20)




￿v dv = 0: (22)
From (20), it follows that ￿v = qv=￿. Then, replacing this last expression into (22) leads to
R
V qz dz = ￿, from where the condition (6) immediately obtains by using again (20).
By using the condition (6), we can rewrite (19) as:
￿v = ￿ (v) + ln[￿(v)=w] ￿ ln￿ + lnQ + [￿ (v) ￿ 1]lnqv: (23)
The expression in (23) will be used in many of the following proofs.
B Optimal Consumption Choice in F
Bearing in mind Assumption 1, we can write down the optimisation problem faced by a repre-




















v ￿ 1; 8v 2 V;
pvq = ￿￿1q￿(v)￿(v); 8(v;q) 2 V ￿ Q:
Lemma 4 holds for x￿
vq in a similar fashion as for xvq. Hence, we can re-state the problem
speci￿ed above in terms of q￿
v and ￿￿
v, as it was previously done for H (where q￿
v now denotes
32the quality of good v consumed, in the optimum, in F). This way, we can obtain the following







; 8v 2 V; (24)
￿￿
v = ￿ (v) + ln[￿(v)=w￿] ￿ ln￿ + lnQ￿ + [￿ (v) ￿ 1]lnq￿
v: (25)
Given the ￿rst-order conditions in (24) and (25), all the ensuing results found in Section 3 fol-
low through in qualitative terms. In particular, we can derive functions fq￿
vgv2V and f￿￿
vgv2V dis-
playing identical qualitative properties as their counterparts in H, that is fqvgv2V and f￿vgv2V,
in terms of Lemmas 1 - 2 and Proposition 1. Furthermore, we can similarly ￿nd the thresh-
old ￿￿ for the worldwide aggregate-productivity parameter, which splits F in the regimes of
subsistence-economy and modern-economy; both exhibiting analogous properties as described
for H.28 Finally, likewise for H in Corollary 1, for F the following holds:
Corollary 2




(i) 8￿ 2 (0;￿￿) ) @#￿ (v)=@￿ = 0, 8v 2 V;
(ii) 8￿ ￿ ￿￿ ) @#￿ (v)=@￿ > 0; 8v 2 V; with strict inequality if v < 1.
C Omitted Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1.
Suppose qv < qv. Since by de￿nition qv ￿ 1, then qv > 1, hence (23) paired with (21) yield:
￿ (v) + ln[￿(v)=w] ￿ ln(￿=Q) ￿ 0;
while:
￿ (v) + ln[￿(v)=w] ￿ ln(￿=Q) + [￿ (v) ￿ 1]lnqv = 0:
Thus:
￿ (v) + ln￿(v) ￿ ￿ (v) + ln￿(v) + [￿ (v) ￿ 1]lnqv:
This last equality in turn leads to:
[￿ (v) ￿ ￿ (v)] + ln[￿(v)=￿(v)] + [￿ (v) ￿ 1]lnqv ￿ 0;
28From Section 4, it is straightforward to observe that, given Assumption 1, ￿
￿ = ￿.
33which cannot possibly hold if qv > 1, as its left-hand side would then be strictly positive.
Therefore, it must necessarily be the case that qv ￿ qv.
Suppose now qv = qv > 1. In this case, (23) in conjunction with (21) yield:
￿ (v) + ln￿(v) + [￿ (v) ￿ 1]lnqv = ￿ (v) + ln￿(v) + [￿ (v) ￿ 1]lnqv = 0:
This last equality in turn leads to:
￿[￿ (v) ￿ ￿ (v)](1 + lnqv) = ln[￿(v)=￿(v)]:
However, this last equality cannot possibly hold since its right-hand side is strictly positive,
while the left-hand side is negative. As a result, qv > qv must necessarily hold when qv > 1.
Proof of Lemma 2.
Part (i). Proof follows immediately from noting that Lemma ?? implies that, whenever ￿ 2
(0;￿), qv = 1 must hold for all v 2 V. Thus, whenever ￿ 2 (0;￿), @qv=@￿ = 0 for all v 2 V.
Part (ii). Firstly, notice that, since qv = 1 must hold for all v = 2 L, a proof analogous to
that of Part (i) of this Lemma applies for all goods in this subset. Secondly, for any v 2 L,
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; 8v 2 L:
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; 8v 2 L: (26)
(Since ￿ (￿) > 1, notice that dqv=d￿ and dq0=d￿ must then share the same sign, for all v 2 L).
Given that:
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34Therefore, from (26) it follows that dqv=d￿ > 0; 8v 2 L must also hold. Finally, from (26) it
immediately follows that dqv=d￿ = dqv=d￿ = 0 if v;v = 2 L, and dqv=d￿ > dqv=d￿ = 0 if v 2 L
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since by assumption ￿ (v) < ￿ (v) and, from Lemma 1, qv > qv.
Proof of Proposition 1.
Part (i). Proof follows immediately from noting that Lemma 2 implies that, whenever ￿ 2
(0;￿), @qv=@￿ = 0 must hold for all v 2 V. Thus, whenever ￿ 2 (0;￿), @￿v=@￿ = 0 for all v 2 V.
Part (ii). Firstly, suppose that that v = 2 L. Then, from Lemma 1 it must also be that
v = 2 L. Hence from Lemma 2 dqv=d￿ = dqv=d￿ = 0, implying in turn that d￿v=d￿ = d￿v=d￿.
Secondly, suppose that v 2 L. Considering the de￿nition of average quality, taking logarithms
and di⁄erentiating (6) with respect to ￿ yields:
(d￿v=d￿)=￿v = (dqv=d￿)=qv ￿ (dQ=d￿)=Q:
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where the last (weak) inequality stems from the fact that if v 2 L then (26) holds for v, whereas











Finally, using (28), the claim trivially follows by noting that, from Lemma 1 in conjunction with
(6), ￿v > ￿v must always hold.
Proof of Corollary 1.
Preliminarily, recall
R
z2V ￿z dz = 1, which implies
R 1
0 (@￿z=@￿)dz = 0:29
Part (i). Claim immediately follows since, whenever ￿ < ￿; @￿z=@￿ = 0 for all z 2 V.









v (@￿z=@￿)dz = 0,
we must necessarily have that
R v
0 (@￿z=@￿)dz > 0.
29Note that it is then trivial to observe that @#(1)=@￿ = 0, 8￿ > 0.
35D Auxiliary Derivations and Proofs
Lemma 3
Let ￿ ￿ a(0)exp[￿ (0)]. Then:
(i) 8￿ 2 (0;￿) ) L = ;;
(ii) 8￿ ￿ ￿ ) L = [0; ~ v(￿)]; where ~ v(￿) : [￿;1) ! [0;1]; ~ v(￿) = 0; ~ v0 (￿) ￿ 0, with strict
inequality if ~ v (￿) < 1.
Proof.
Part (i). When ￿ 2 (0;￿), conditions stipulated in (21) and (23) applied on v = 0 entail that:
q0 = 1 and ￿0 > 0. As a result, from Lemma 1 it follows that qv = 1, 8v 2 V: Therefore, since
a0 (v) ￿ 0 and ￿0 (v) > 0, again from (23), ￿v > 0 for all v 2 V obtains, and thus L = ;.
Part (ii). Firstly, note that (23) applied on v = 0, in conjunction Lemma 1, implies that when
￿ = ￿, then ￿0 = 0 and q0 = 1. Then, Lemma 1 implies Q = 1. Using these results in (23)
yields:
￿v = ￿ (v) + ln[￿(v)=w] ￿ ln￿;
implying that ￿v > 0 for all v 2 (0;1]. As a result, the set L = ;, meaning that ~ v(￿) = 0.
Secondly, notice that, from Lemma 4 below, @￿0;v (v)=@v < 0 and @￿0;v (v)=@v < 0 since
a0 (v) ￿ 0 and ￿0 (v) > 0, hence the set L ￿ V comprises the lower-indexed goods in V, with
~ v(￿) representing its upper bound. Given Lemma 1 and Lemma 5 below, the aggregate quality
index can be written as follows:




Furthermore, observe that, whenever ~ v(￿) < 1:
ln(￿=Q) = ￿ (~ v(￿)) + ln[￿(~ v(￿))=w]
must hold in equilibrium. This last condition yields, after some simple algebra:
Q = ￿wexp[￿￿ (~ v)]=￿(~ v):
In addition to that, because of Lemma 1, in equilibrium:
[￿ (v) ￿ 1]lnqv = ln(￿=Q) ￿ ￿ (v) ￿ ln[￿(v)=w]
36must hold for any v ￿ ~ v(￿). By using the former in the latter, after some algebra, we may
obtain:








￿ (~ v(￿)) ￿ ￿ (v)
￿ (v) ￿ 1
￿
, 8v 2 [0; ~ v(￿)]: (29)
In equilibrium, it must be the case that:
￿wexp[￿￿ (~ v(￿))]=a(~ v(￿)) = 1 ￿ ~ v(￿) +
Z ~ v(￿)
0
qv (~ v(￿)) dv; (30)




























+ ￿0 (~ v(￿))
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where the last inequality follows from the properties of the functions ￿(￿) and ￿ (￿).
Lemma 4














> 0, and ￿0;v ￿
￿ (0) ￿ 1
￿ (v) ￿ 1
> 0.
Proof.
Recall that qv = 1, 8v = 2 L. For all other goods, (23) in conjunction with (21) yield:
￿ (v) + ln￿(v) + [￿ (v) ￿ 1]lnqv = ￿ (0) + ln￿(0) + [￿ (0) ￿ 1]lnq0; 8v 2 L:
30For the rest of the proof, we will assume that the envelope function ￿(v) is di⁄erentiable at all points. It
must be straightforward to observe, though, that the function ￿(v) is strictly increasing in v, since both a(v) and
a
￿(v) are strictly increasing in v, and that this monotonicity is su¢ cient to ensure monotonicity of e v(￿), which is
the important feature of e v(￿) that we require in our model.








￿(0)￿1 ; 8v 2 L:
Finally, raising both sides to the power [￿ (v) ￿ 1]
￿1, and considering Lemma 1, (31) obtains.
Lemma 5
If ~ v(￿) < 1, then q~ v(￿) = 1.
Proof.
By de￿nition of L, ￿~ v(￿) = 0. Thus, the condition (23) applied on ~ v(￿) yields:
￿ (~ v(￿)) + ln[￿(~ v(￿))=w] ￿ ln￿ + lnQ = ￿[￿ (~ v(￿)) ￿ 1]lnq~ v(￿) (32)
Suppose now that q~ v(￿) > 1, and take some " 2 (0;1 ￿ ~ v(￿)]. Then, since v = ~ v(￿) + " = 2 L, it
must be the case that:
￿ (~ v(￿) + ") + ln[￿(~ v(￿) + ")=w] ￿ ln￿ + lnQ = ￿~ v(￿)+": (33)
Then, by continuity of ￿ (￿) and ￿(￿), and using the result in (32), we must have:
lim
"!0
f￿ (~ v(￿) + ") + ln[￿(~ v(￿) + ")=w] ￿ ln￿ + lnQg = ￿[￿ (~ v(￿)) ￿ 1]lnq~ v(￿) < 0:
Hence, q~ v(￿) > 1 cannot possibly hold when ~ v(￿) < 1 as it would imply that ￿~ v(￿)+" < 0 in (33)
for " ! 0, violating (21).
Proof of @#(m)=@w ￿ 0.
Suppose ￿rst that ~ v < m. Then, L ￿[0;m). Di⁄erentiating (23) with respect to w yields:









= 0; 8v 2 L: (34)




￿ (0) ￿ 1





; 8v 2 L: (35)
Since @Q=@w =
R ~ v
0 (@qz=@w)dz, combining (34) and (35) yields:
￿




￿ (z) ￿ 1
qzdz
￿










38Therefore, using again (35), @qv=@w = 0 for all v 2 [0; ~ v] obtains. In addition, because of Lemma
1, it must thus be the case that @qv=@w = 0 holds as well for all v 2 (~ v;1]. Finally, recalling (6)
it then follows that @￿v=@w = 0 for all v 2 V, which in turn implies that @#(m)=@w = 0.
Suppose now that ~ v ￿ m. Di⁄erentiating (23) with respect to w now yields:













0; 8v 2 [0;m)
1=w; 8v 2 [m; ~ v]
(36)
From (36) it follows that a necessary condition for @#(m)=@w > 0 to hold is that @Q=@w < 0.31
However, (36) means that if @Q=@w < 0, then @qv=@w > 0 should hold for all v 2 [m; ~ v]. If
~ v = 1; it must be straightforward to observe that @Q=@w < 0 cannot thus hold. Alternatively, if
~ v < 1, then @Q=@w < 0 would require that @qv=@w < 0 prevails for some v 2 (~ v;1] which is not
feasible either since it would lead to violating the constraint qv ￿ 1. As a result, @Q=@w ￿ 0
must hold, which in turn implies @#(m)=@w ￿ 0.
Proof of @#￿ (m)=@w < 0.
Suppose ￿rst that ~ v￿ < m. Then, L￿￿[0;m). Di⁄erentiating (23) ￿adjusted for representing
an individual from F ￿with respect to w yields:














; 8v 2 L￿: (37)
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; 8v 2 L￿: (38)
Combining (37) and (38) leads to:
 




￿ (z) ￿ 1
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Hence, using again (38), @q￿
v=@w < 0 for all v 2 [0; ~ v￿] obtains, which in turn implies @Q￿=@w <
0. Next, since for all v ￿ ~ v￿ the constraint q￿
v ￿ 1 is binding, it must be the case that @q￿
v=@w ￿ 0,
8v 2 (~ v￿;1]. As a result, because of (6), @￿￿
v=@w > 0 for all v 2 [m;1] follows, which in turn
implies @#￿ (m)=@w < 0.
Suppose now ~ v￿ ￿ m. Di⁄erentiating (23) with respect to w now yields:















￿1=w; 8v 2 [0;m)
0; 8v 2 [m; ~ v￿]
(39)
31Otherwise, if @Q=@w ￿ 0, (36) would imply that @qv=@w ￿ 0 for all v 2 [0;m). Recalling (6), it is then
straightforward to observe that @Q=@w ￿ 0 would mean @￿v=@w ￿ 0 for all v 2 [0;m), which in turn leads to
@#(m)=@m ￿ 0.
39Suppose @Q￿=@w ￿ 0. From (39) it follows that @q￿
v=@w < 0 for all v 2 [0; ~ v￿). Furthermore,
Lemma 1 then implies that @q￿
v=@w ￿ 0 for all v 2 [~ v￿;1]; as a result, @Q￿=@w < 0 must
necessarily hold. Now, notice that if @Q￿=@w < 0, then (39) implies @q￿
v=@w > 0 for all v 2
[m; ~ v￿]. Moreover, in case ~ v￿ < 1, since 8v 2 (~ v￿;1] the constraint q￿
v ￿ 1 is binding, @q￿
v=@w ￿ 0
must necessarily hold for all v 2 (~ v￿;1]. As a result, if @Q￿=@w < 0, then @￿￿
v=@w > 0 for all
v 2 [m;1], which in turn leads to @#￿ (m)=@w < 0.
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